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MOORE’S POTENTIAL
June Carbone* & Naomi Cahn**
INTRODUCTION
Underlying the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland1 are long-term changes in the relationship between the family
and the state. These changes upended the reciprocities between the state
definition of legitimate families and the basis for claims of state recognition
and support. Today, in contrast, many view the determination of what
constitutes a family as a matter of personal self-definition to which the state
should defer, producing even greater division in the relationship between
families—however they are defined—and claims to state support.
These issues have become the subject of an intense culture war.2 On the
one hand, conservatives continue to view married, gendered, two-parent
families as essential to societal well-being; thus, they favor traditional
family values in the public square and the provision of state support to
families only in the context of shared community values.3 Liberals, in
contrast, emphasize tolerance in the public square and promote greater state
support for all children regardless of family structure, viewing it as
necessary to realizing the promises of equality and participatory citizenship
in a democracy.4
The Supreme Court decided Moore before the modern cultural divide on
the structure of the family fully took hold; thus, Moore’s various opinions
do not directly address this culture divide. Yet, in two critical parts of the
* Robina Chair of Law, Science and Technology, University of Minnesota. We thank Clare
Huntington, Robin Lenhardt, and all of the participants at the Fordham Law Review Family
Law Symposium entitled Moore Kinship held at Fordham University School of Law. For an
overview of the symposium, see R.A. Lenhardt & Clare Huntington, Foreword: Moore
Kinship, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2551 (2017).
** Harold H. Greene Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.
1. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
2. See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL
POLARIZATION AND THE CREATION OF CULTURE 1 (2010).
3. Scholars term this system, which treats gendered, two-parent marriages as critical to
children’s support, as the privatization of dependency. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES 161–62 (1995).
4. See June Carbone, “Blue” Morality and the Legitimacy of the State—Ed Rubin’s
Soul, Self, and Society: The New Morality and the Modern State, LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
(Aug. 25, 2016) (reviewing EDWARD L. RUBIN, SOUL, SELF, AND SOCIETY: THE NEW
MORALITY AND THE MODERN STATE (2015)), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/
lsi.12223/full [https://perma.cc/7AUL-SC6J].
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decision, the Court seemed to have anticipated this culture conflict,
foreshadowing the tension between the growing desire of individuals to
define “family” in terms of their own choosing and the state’s power to
define what constitutes a legitimate family form and, thus, to decide who is
entitled to state support.
First, in granting Inez Moore a constitutional right to live with a family
that included both of her grandchildren, the plurality based its decision on
tradition, not autonomy.5 At the time, judicial conservatives had not yet
hijacked tradition as support for constitutional originalism and judicial
liberals had not yet unequivocally embraced individual choice as a source
of protection for alternative families. Thus, Moore is a methodologically
conservative opinion that celebrates the traditional institution of the family
through the vehicle of a grandmother-headed extended family. In this
sense, Moore has much in common with Obergefell v. Hodges,6 which
reconciled an alternative family with mainstream institutions.7
Second, while embracing Moore’s extended family as part of a
longstanding tradition, Moore only narrowly accords recognition to the
“traditional family” in this extended family form as entitled to
constitutional protection.8 Instead, the various opinions saw this particular
family structure as a fallback option that served as a privatized form of
insurance to provide for children in times of financial or other family
stress.9 Notably, none of the opinions discuss the circumstances that led to
the grandchildren’s residence with their grandmother, other than noting the
death of one of the children’s mothers.10 Rather, the case honors a worthy
individual—a grandmother who takes in her multiple grandchildren—
without fully exploring the relationship between family and economic wellbeing in the changing American landscape. Thus, while crafting an opinion
that does not challenge the deference due to land use decisions, the Justices
also avoided laying a foundation for alternative families to claim state
support in either practical or doctrinal terms.
At the time of the decision, single-family zoning restrictions, which
might not have been controversial in other eras, were emerging as markers
of race and class and were facing mounting legal challenges.11 Today,
studies indicate that racially and economically integrated communities tend
to enhance the well-being and achievement of poor families without
undermining those who are better off.12 Yet, local zoning laws, particularly
5. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 504–06.
6. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
7. Id. at 2595–96.
8. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–05.
9. See id. at 505.
10. Id. at 496–97.
11. See, e.g., S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(N.J. 1975).
12. See, e.g., Raj Chetty & Nathaniel Hendren, The Impacts of Neighborhoods on
Intergenerational Mobility: Childhood Exposure Effects and County-Level Estimates 73
(May 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/hendren/files/nbhds_
paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/UC44-8XCQ].
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when tied to family characteristics, tend to encourage racial and financial
segregation, compounding the disadvantages of poor communities of
color.13 In particular, these laws give every community an incentive to
adopt zoning restrictions that attract stable, higher-income families and
exclude those likely to be poorer, needier, and a drain on community
desirability or resources.14 In the face of the widespread adoption of such
exclusionary practices, communities that adopt broader definitions of
acceptable households may find themselves at a disadvantage in sustaining
an appropriate mix of households. Thus, East Cleveland, a heavily African
American community struggling to maintain its middle-class status, adopted
the zoning laws at issue in Moore in an effort to stave off a downward cycle
in the community’s fortunes.15 The opinions in Moore, however, never
acknowledged this community dynamic at work.
Part I of this Article briefly explores the culture wars that have consumed
American politics since Moore. Part II discusses Moore’s uneasy position
within the conception of family as a matter of choice versus tradition.
Then, to the extent that the Moore Court addressed the changing family,
Part III shows how it did so by treating the extended family as a
manifestation of traditional family values, not the newly emerging
substantive family values that valorize delay in childbearing and financial
independence.16 Finally, Part IV considers Moore’s missed opportunities to
examine the relationship between family form, race, and class.
I. CULTURE WARS REVISITED
Scholars routinely describe American politics—and the disputes about
family values—as a culture war.17 While there is no popularly accepted
definition of what that culture war is about, it certainly includes differences
about the source of moral values,18 the increasing ideological identification
of American political parties,19 deeply rooted personality differences in

13. See generally J. Peter Byrne, Are the Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2265
(1997) (reviewing CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND
AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996), and DAVID L. KIRP ET AL., OUR TOWN: RACE, HOUSING, AND THE
SOUL OF SUBURBIA (1995)).
14. See id. at 2269 (describing the social and economic incentives for exclusionary
zoning as “the political independence of suburban jurisdictions, the near-complete delegation
of zoning power by the state to the locality, the reliance on local taxes to fund local
government services (particularly education), and national policies facilitating and
subsidizing suburban development on a scale never undertaken before”).
15. See Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 389.
16. The authors term this distinction as red versus blue family values. See generally
CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2.
17. See infra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.
18. See generally RUBIN, supra note 4.
19. See John T. Jost, The End of the End of Ideology, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 651, 654
(2006).
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values orientation,20 differences in forms of expression,21 and the role of the
family in civic life.22
However the culture wars are defined, the family has been a central part
of that dispute, which can be described as a clash between “red” versus
“blue” family values—or, more generally, as part of a traditionalist versus
modernist cultural divide. At the core of the divide are two different
worldviews with overlapping political and family consequences. The blue
system combines “public tolerance with private discipline.”23 In this
modernist system, people choose individually crafted values, central to selfdefinition and personal self-worth.24 In contrast, the red system advocates
public orthodoxy and private forgiveness.25 In this traditionalist system,
values must be externally derived—from God, from authority grounded in
tradition, or from human nature—to have meaning, and they should
accordingly be upheld in the public square.26 Repentance, forgiveness, and
reconciliation with the community occur in private.27
The differences between these two systems have implications for both
legal justifications and content. Blue legal justifications uphold individual
choice; red justifications look to sources of value outside the individual,
such as tradition, authority, or community consensus.28 In terms of content,
blue analysis favors a functional approach that looks at the importance of
family roles, while red analysis favors time-honored definitions of family
regularity.29 Thus, blue analysis is less tied to either continuity or
institutional regularity.30
Using these differing approaches, one can evaluate the family
transformations in the latter part of the twentieth century. Values about
family form changed from a uniform emphasis on the necessity of
heterosexual marriage (i.e., the traditionalist red system) to the acceptability
of alternative family forms (i.e., the modernist blue system).31 At the same
time, the pathways into the middle class changed from shepherding couples
into early marriages to encouraging lengthy delays in family formation that
better prepared parents for the responsibilities of family life.32 The process
20. See DONALD BRAMAN ET AL., CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT AT YALE LAW SCH.,
THE SECOND NATIONAL RISK AND CULTURE STUDY: MAKING SENSE OF—AND PROGRESS
IN—THE AMERICAN CULTURE WAR OF FACT 16 (2007).
21. See GEORGE LAKOFF, DON’T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!: KNOW YOUR VALUES AND
FRAME THE DEBATE 1–29 (2014); GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS: HOW LIBERALS AND
CONSERVATIVES THINK 143–52 (2d ed. 2002).
22. See generally CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2.
23. See id. at 3–4.
24. See id. at 44.
25. See Carbone, supra note 4, at 4–5.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 16.
28. See id. at 2 n.1.
29. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 6–7.
30. Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015) (plurality opinion)
(accepting changes over time in the meaning of marriage), with id. at 2612–16 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting) (treating marriage as an unchanging, time-honored system).
31. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 33–46.
32. See id.
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of transformation and the conflicts between the two systems exacerbate
racial and class differences33 and frame the perspectives that underlie
Moore.
II. CHOICE VERSUS TRADITION AS A SOURCE OF VALUES
The facts of Moore are straightforward. Sixty-three-year-old Inez Moore
shared her home with her adult son, Dale Sr., and her two young
grandchildren, Dale Jr. and John Jr.34 Six years after John Jr. came to live
with his grandmother following his mother’s death, the City of East
Cleveland prosecuted Moore for violating the city’s single-family zoning
ordinance.35 The Ohio state courts upheld the conviction, but the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down the ordinance in what should have been a
relatively easy decision, given the harshness of the impact on a sympathetic
grandmother.36 Nonetheless, the result sharply divided the Court and
obscured the case’s broader significance for the legal recognition of
families and for the interactions among race, class, and family orthodoxy.
The Supreme Court declared the ordinance unconstitutional on its face
but only by a vote of five to four and with disagreement among the five
Justices in the majority on the basis for doing so. In total, the Justices filed
six separate opinions. This part focuses on three of those opinions: (1)
Justice John Paul Stevens’s concurring opinion, (2) Justice Lewis Powell’s
plurality opinion, and (3) Justice Potter Stewart’s dissenting opinion.
A. Justice Stevens’s Concurrence
Writing only for himself, Justice Stevens issued the most far-reaching
opinion, concurring only in the judgment.37 While his concurrence is
viewed as idiosyncratic, Stevens may well have anticipated later judicial
developments in his desire to avoid a publicly imposed definition of family.
Unlike any of the other Justices, Stevens described the case as one that
started with Moore’s choice of how to constitute her family. He thus
framed the case in terms of the arbitrariness of the ordinance, observing that
the “city has failed totally to explain the need for a rule that would allow a
homeowner to have two grandchildren live with her if they are brothers but
not if they are cousins.”38 In emphasizing Moore’s ability to choose her
family form, however, Stevens faced a dilemma: if Moore could define
family in whatever terms she chooses, it would be hard to associate her

33. See generally id.
34. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496 (1977).
35. Id. at 497. John Jr., who was ten years old by the time the Supreme Court decided
the case, had lived with his grandmother since his mother died when he was less than a year
old, and his father, John Sr., apparently lived with the family as well. Id. at 497 n.4; see Brief
for Appellant at 4, Moore, 431 U.S. 494 (No. 75-6289), 1976 WL 178722, at *4.
36. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 507 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he zoning power is not a
license for local communities to enact senseless and arbitrary restrictions which cut deeply
into private areas of protected family life.”).
37. See id. at 513–21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 520–21.
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particular definition of family with constitutional protection. Stevens
skirted this issue by according Moore constitutional protection as a
homeowner, rather than on the basis of her family form.39 Stevens wrote
that Moore’s interest in her ability to live with both grandsons was
particularly important with respect to a rule that cuts “deeply into a
fundamental right normally associated with the ownership of residential
property—that of an owner to decide who may reside on his or her
property.”40
Stevens’s decision not to define the “family” that is entitled to
constitutional protection encouraged him to take on an issue the other
Justices in the majority wished to avoid: the standard of deference due to
state zoning decisions.41 The Moore dissent, much like the Supreme
Court’s 1974 decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,42 accorded such
ordinances substantial deference, requiring only a rational relationship to a
permissible state objective.43 In contrast, Stevens wrote that, because the
ordinance
ha[d] not been shown to have any “substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare” of the city of East Cleveland,
and . . . [because] it must fall under [this Court’s] limited standard of
review of zoning decisions[,] . . . East Cleveland’s unprecedented
ordinance constitutes a taking of property without due process and
without just compensation.44

Such a standard—requiring a showing of a “substantial” rather than a
“rational” relationship between a zoning regulation and public policy
concerns—would have substantially increased the scrutiny applicable to
local zoning ordinances that infringed on property owners’ associational
rights. By tying his decision to the Takings Clause of the Constitution,
Stevens did not depend on a particular construction of the constitutional
rights accorded families. Instead, Stevens emphasized that the state had a
legitimate interest in regulating “the identity, as opposed to the number, of
persons who may compose a household only to the extent that the
ordinances require such households to remain nontransient, singlehousekeeping units.”45 Had his opinion been the majority, it would have
provided the basis for challenging restrictive zoning provisions throughout
the country, in effect limiting, though not necessarily overturning, the
Court’s decision in Belle Terre, which upheld a similar single family zoning
restriction as it applied to unrelated individuals.46 The ordinance in Belle
Terre appeared to be aimed primarily at restricting the number of college

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 520.
Id.
Id. at 519–21.
416 U.S. 1 (1974).
Moore, 431 U.S. at 538–39 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 520–21 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 519.
Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 1.
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students in the area;47 it would not have prevented Moore from living with
her grandsons.48
B. Justice Powell’s Plurality Opinion
In contrast, Justice Powell, joined by three other Justices, wrote a
plurality opinion emphasizing the constitutional protection afforded
families49 and grounding the definition of “families” in tradition.50 In
subjecting the East Cleveland ordinance to greater scrutiny than that
associated with a rational relationship test, the plurality shifted its emphasis
away from property rights, where it viewed a rational relationship test as
appropriate, and toward the intrusion on family.51 The Court observed that
East Cleveland “has chosen to regulate the occupancy of its housing by
slicing deeply into the family itself,”52 making it “a crime of a
grandmother’s choice to live with her grandson in circumstances like those
presented” in the case.53 The plurality opinion thus based its analysis on
the Due Process Clause, holding that the “Court has long recognized that
freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of
the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”54 In turn, this analysis required the Court to provide a
definition of the family to be accorded constitutional protection; the
plurality adopted a conservative definition.55
In articulating a notion of the family that justified constitutional
protection, the plurality looked to tradition and observed that the extended
family was at least as deeply rooted in tradition as the nuclear family, if not
more so.56 The nuclear family, in contrast, was a recent development.57
The plurality then noted that “[e]ven if conditions of modern society have
brought about a decline in extended family households,”58 it remains true
that “[t]he tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents
sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally
venerable and equally deserving of constitutional recognition.”59 The
opinion found this tradition in “the accumulated wisdom of civilization,
gained over the centuries and honored throughout our history, that supports
a larger conception of the family.”60 The Justices thus treated as
47. See id.
48. Moore, 431 U.S. at 519 n.15 (Stevens, J., concurring).
49. See generally Brief for Appellant, supra note 35.
50. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–05 (plurality opinion).
51. Id. at 498–500.
52. Id. at 498.
53. Id. at 499.
54. Id. (quoting Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974)).
55. Id. at 505.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 504.
60. Id. at 505. As a matter of constitutional jurisprudence, Moore and Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), are based on similar views of how to find the traditions
protected by the Due Process Clause.
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commonplace the recognition of extended relatives as family and viewed
the grandmother’s actions in taking in both of her grandchildren as
admirable. In doing so, the plurality adopted a normative vision of the
family entitled to constitutional protection—a fundamentally different
approach from Stevens’s modernist embrace of choice. Accordingly, the
Court acknowledged that affording constitutional protection to families
required providing a substantive definition of what constituted a family.61
Moreover, the plurality did not question the ability of governmental
authorities to define what they meant by family; the opinion simply
required that the definition accept families determined by blood, adoption,
and marriage.
C. Justice Stewart’s Dissent
Justice Stewart’s dissent, joined by Justice William Rehnquist, sought
both to narrow the definition of the family and to limit the constitutional
protection accorded to such families.62 In doing so, it turned the plurality’s
emphasis of the result’s arbitrariness on its head. Stewart wrote that the
interest that the appellant may have in permanently sharing a single
kitchen and a suite of contiguous rooms with some of her relatives simply
does not rise [to the level of a constitutionally protected interest]. To
equate this interest with the fundamental decisions to marry and to bear
and raise children is to extend the limited substantive contours of the Due
Process Clause beyond recognition.63

Stewart’s belittling comments, which assumed that Moore could simply
have some of the family live in the other dwelling unit she owned in the
same building,64 suggested that Stevens’s associational interests were not
worthy of constitutional protection and that Moore’s choices about which
relatives to invite into her residence had nothing to do with the definition of
a constitutionally protected family.65 In short, the Constitution did not
protect “choice” in the modernist sense at all.
A fuller embrace of the idea of choice would come decades in the future.
Consider, as a point in contrast, Justice Kennedy’s opening paragraph in
Lawrence v. Texas,66 which struck down a statute criminalizing same-sex
sodomy. Justice Kennedy wrote:
Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought,
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves
liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent
dimensions.67

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Moore, 431 U.S. at 503–05.
Id. at 531–41 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 537.
Id. at 533 & n.4.
Id. at 537.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Id. at 562.
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Justice Stevens’s concurrence would be as close as the Moore Court would
come to the modernist embrace of an individual right of self-definition.68
III. MOORE AND TWENTIETH-CENTURY
FAMILY TRANSFORMATION
The Moore opinion, in addition to its refusal to embrace the rhetoric of
family choice, also skirted the substantive family transformation that was
taking place in the latter part of the twentieth century. That transformation
involved a shift from marriage as part of a universal transition from
adolescence into adulthood to family formation as a choice best made by
those who have attained emotional maturity and financial independence.69
The change required an embrace of contraception and, if necessary,
abortion as critical to the postponement of childbearing, greater acceptance
of nonmarital sexuality, and the redefinition of what had been gendered
family roles.70
Moore could have been cast in such terms. Doing so, however, would
have required shifting the focus from the grandmother, who is sympathetic
under any definition of family values, to her two sons, the fathers of her
grandchildren. We know relatively little about the sons. We know that the
first son, Dale Sr., and his child, Dale Jr., were living with Moore before the
case arose.71 Only when the second grandson, John Jr., joined the
household did the family violate the East Cleveland ordinance.72 John Jr.
came to live with Moore when his mother died.73 The opinion, however,
tells us nothing about the circumstances. These issues are irrelevant to the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Moore—the Court addressed only the
application of the East Cleveland ordinance to the grandmother’s decision
to live with both of her grandchildren.
Instead, Moore ties the extended family to a tradition that privatizes
family support. Moore is a homeowner, and there was no indication that
she received public benefits to care for her grandchildren. When her sons
needed assistance with the care of their children, whether because of John
Jr.’s mother’s death or their own financial needs, they turned to a family
member—not the state—for assistance. These factors make Moore part of a
long-standing tradition of neoliberal family support, and the Justices who
join in the plurality opinion championing Moore’s position do so in
precisely these terms.

68. The question of whether the Supreme Court has ever embraced a modernist
definition of family formation as a matter of individual expression is complex. For critiques
of Lawrence, which unmoors its analysis from blood, marriage, and adoptions but still relies
on traditionalist tropes of what an intimate relationship constitutes, see Katherine M. Franke,
The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (2004).
69. CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 20–22.
70. Id. at 19–46.
71. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 533 (1977) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 496–97 (plurality opinion).
73. Id.
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Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, had grounded constitutional
protection of the family in its deep roots “in this Nation’s history and
tradition.”74 He acknowledged that extended families had become less
likely to live together but emphasized that they still came together in times
of need.75 He treated the extended family as a fallback option, a form of
insurance policy designed to protect the children from the failings of their
parents. This reasoning thus broke little new ground in the definition of the
family.
Justice William Brennan filed a concurrence, together with Justice
Thurgood Marshall, that went further than the plurality in acknowledging
the roots of family diversity. The concurrence agreed with the plurality that
the ordinance impermissibly infringed upon Moore’s choice of what
constituted family and that the plurality’s acceptance of the extended family
by blood had deeply embedded roots.76 Brennan, however, emphasized that
the East Cleveland ordinance displayed “a depressing insensitivity toward
the economic and emotional needs of a very large part of our society.”77
Brennan’s concurrence linked the extended family to generations of
immigrant families and to class and racial differences, noting:
Even in husband and wife households, 13% of black families compared
with 3% of white families include relatives under 18 years old, in addition
to the couple’s own children. In black households whose head is an
elderly woman, as in this case, the contrast is even more striking: 48% of
such black households, compared with 10% of counterpart white
households, include related minor children not offspring of the head of the
household.78

The concurrence thus saw the East Cleveland ordinance as arbitrarily
refusing to recognize not only a long-established family form but also a
family form associated with poor and minority families and of continuing
importance to those experiencing financial stress.79 In short, the extended
family is a consequence of compulsion rather than choice, and the
conclusion of both the plurality opinion and the concurrence is that the
ordinance is arbitrary, if not counterproductive. The plurality, by grounding
its analysis in tradition, could accordingly strike it down without
74. Id. at 503.
75. Id. at 505.
76. Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 508.
78. Id. at 509–10; see also Brief for Appellant, supra note 35, at 12.
79. Indeed, Brennan’s concurrence, which went further than the other opinions in
endorsing the benefits of extended families, also saw extended families as a consequence of
economic stress, observing:
The “extended family” that provided generations of early Americans with social
services and economic and emotional support in times of hardship, and was the
beachhead for successive waves of immigrants who populated our cities, remains
not merely still a pervasive living pattern, but under the goad of brutal economic
necessity, a prominent pattern—virtually a means of survival—for large numbers
of the poor and deprived minorities of our society. For them compelled pooling of
scant resources requires compelled sharing of a household.
Id. at 508.
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influencing either the likely course of family evolution or the patterns of
racial and economic segregation that affect American cities.
The four dissenting Justices also faced a dilemma. They, too, should
have viewed Moore approvingly. Yet, they wanted to preserve the ability
of zoning boards to reinforce the links between property values and
mainstream families, however the particular community defined them.
They therefore did not want to address the definition of family at all.80
These opinions, while sharing Stevens’s determination not to embed a
definition of family in the Constitution, disagreed with his expansion of the
constitutional rights of homeowners vis-à-vis the state and thus sought ways
to allow the Court to look the other way.81
The multiple opinions in Moore, while disagreeing sharply with each
other in the framing of the issues and in their conclusions about the result,
do not challenge the definition of what constitutes a family nor the ability of
zoning authorities to define families and to channel82 appropriate residential
behavior. To the extent any of the opinions extended constitutional
protection to families, they did so on the basis of blood ties rather than
choice.83 The four Justices who joined the plurality opinion grounded their
conclusion not only in tradition but also in the practicalities of a private
system of family support.84 A grandmother who comes to the aid of her
grandchildren, after all, vindicates both traditionalist and modernist family
values. Although Moore breaks new ground in protecting a grandmother
from the vagaries of a local zoning ordinance, it does not fundamentally
change the understandings of what constitutes a family—nor do much to
restrict exclusionary zoning laws.
IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FAMILY, CLASS, AND RACE:
THE UNFINISHED DISCUSSION
Moore is indubitably about the intersection of family, class, and race.
Brennan’s concurrence observed that the nuclear family is a pattern
associated with “white suburbia”85 and stressed that the “Constitution
80. Id. at 521–22 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that the right solution was for
Moore to seek a variance from the local zoning officials).
81. See, e.g., id. at 550–51 (White, J., dissenting) (adopting a deferential standard of
review toward zoning ordinances). In fact, many states have dealt with exclusionary zoning
provisions in exactly this way, keeping such restrictions on the books and then backing down
only in the face of determined (or embarrassing) opposition. Such challenges, though, may
be beyond the reach of financially stressed extended families. See Kent W. Bartholomew,
Comment, The Definition of “Family” in Missouri Local Zoning Ordinances: An Analysis
of the Justifications for Restrictive Definitions, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 631, 665–66 (2008).
82. See generally June Carbone, Out of the Channel and into the Swamp: How Family
Law Fails in a New Era of Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859 (2011); Linda C.
McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the Channelling Function of
Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133 (2007); Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling
Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992).
83. In this sense, Stevens’s opinion grounds its protection of Moore on her rights as a
homeowner, not on a right extended to families per se. See supra Part II.A.
84. Moore, 431 U.S. at 505 (plurality opinion).
85. Id. at 508 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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cannot be interpreted . . . to tolerate the imposition by government upon the
rest of us of white suburbia’s preference in patterns of family living.”86 It
documented the dramatically greater association of extended families in
African American communities than in white communities. It also
commented that this may reflect “the truism that black citizens, like
generations of white immigrants before them, have been victims of
economic and other disadvantages that would worsen if they were
compelled to abandon extended, for nuclear, living patterns.”87
None of the opinions acknowledge, however, the role of the changing
family in exacerbating race and class disparities. The plurality celebrated
the traditional extended family without noting its association with
marriage.88 In some communities, extended families permitted earlier
marriages, with the new bride and groom moving in with their parents, or
they contributed to the ability of working-class mothers to work outside the
home or to care for elderly or disabled relatives. And they have long served
as the fallback helping to deal with the consequences of death or divorce.89
By the late 1970s, however, extended families were also dealing with a
national decline in marriage.90 Both better-off and poorer women had
become more sexually active, and the importance of the shotgun marriage
was decreasing for both.91 Ambitious women responded by embracing
contraception and abortion, while working-class women became more
likely to give birth without marrying. Extended families, especially in
African American communities, were associated with “matrifocal
families.”92
This created a dilemma for zoning boards. East Cleveland was a
predominately African American community, with an African American
city manager and city commission.93 Robert Burt observed that “the
purpose of the ordinance was quite straightforward: to exclude from a
middle-class, predominantly black community, that saw itself as socially
and economically upwardly mobile, other black families most characteristic
of lower-class ghetto life.”94 This purpose does not make sense if extended
families simply served as fallback options for nuclear families experiencing
hardships, such as the death of a child’s mother. Instead, Burt emphasized
that the problem with these extended families was not so much that they
were multigenerational but that they were female headed and
“disproportionately characteristic of black lower-income households.”95

86. Id.
87. Id. at 509.
88. Id. at 503–06 (plurality opinion).
89. JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY
LAW (2000).
90. See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2, at 19–32.
91. Id. at 34–37.
92. Burt, supra note 15, at 388.
93. Moore, 431 U.S. at 537 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
94. Burt, supra note 15, at 389.
95. Id. at 388.

2017]

MOORE’S POTENTIAL

2601

By adopting this ordinance, East Cleveland thus sought to preserve its
middle-class character, not its racial character. Moore may also have been
trying to preserve her family’s middle-class status by including her
grandchildren in the home she owned in a better part of town than may have
been available to her sons if they sought to live with their children on their
own. Justice Stewart dismisses the importance of Moore’s interest in living
in East Cleveland, describing the city as “an area with a radius of three
miles and a population of 40,000” and suggesting that Moore could move
with her grandchildren to some other part of town.96 Yet, none of the
opinions tell us how easy that would have been, given the racial
composition of the rest of the area, or how easy it would have been for
Moore to sell her home or find a similar house she could afford elsewhere.
Moreover, moving would have almost certainly been disruptive for her and
her grandchildren.97
The fundamental socioeconomic question underlying the case involves
the role of economic and racial segregation in limiting social mobility and
compounding the effects that may be associated with family form. Modern
research indicates that, holding constant for other factors, some
communities promote social mobility better than others.98
The
communities that provide the greatest advantages have “lower rates of
residential segregation by income and race, lower levels of income
inequality, better schools, lower rates of violent crime, and a larger share of
two-parent households.”99 Moreover, children who move from lessadvantaged to more-advantaged communities enjoy significant advantages
even if their parents remain poor and they continue to live in single-parent
families.100 Ironically, therefore, Moore had strong interests—to preserve
the value of the property she owned and to provide a decent life for her
grandchildren—in living in an area with more nuclear family households.
And East Cleveland, in turn, best served Moore’s interests by allowing her
to remain without (again, ironically) attracting many more families like
hers.101
Given these realities, neither the Supreme Court nor the City of East
Cleveland nor Moore had any good options in addressing this issue, and
none of the Moore opinions discuss the community effects underlying the
case. The dissents wished to affirm the validity of local zoning laws
without acknowledging the role such ordinances play in promoting racial
and economic segregation. The plurality wished to affirm the legitimacy of
extended family households without acknowledging that a concentration of

96. Moore, 431 U.S. at 550 (White, J., dissenting).
97. See William G. Austin, Relocation, Research, and Forensic Evaluation, Part I:
Effects of Residential Mobility on Children of Divorce, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 137, 140 (2008)
(demonstrating the harmful effects of residential mobility on children).
98. See generally CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 2.
99. CHETTY & HENDREN, supra note 12, at 7.
100. Id.
101. This is true so long as extended families in fact serve the role, as described in Justice
Brennan’s plurality opinion, of providing a privatized way of dealing with family stress.
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single-parent families tends to undermine community well-being.102 Justice
Stevens, in giving homeowners a right to association without tying it to
constitutional protection for families, penned the most radically
individualistic opinion, elevating property rights over community efforts to
enhance property values. Yet, it seems closer in spirit to objections to the
exercise of the power of eminent domain103 than to cases like Lawrence that
grant a right of intimate association. Considered in retrospect, Moore
stands as a common sense invalidation of an arbitrary definition of single
family applied to produce unsupportable results in the case of a sympathetic
grandmother. It has not contributed, however, to any greater appreciation
of how the constitution of families104 interacts with the constitution of
communities to determine societal well-being.
CONCLUSION
In the years after Moore, the cultural, racial, and economic divisions
centered on the family have increased. A large number of states have struck
down restrictive zoning measures based on family form, while a significant
number of other states have refused to do so.105 In 1979, less-traditional
families were still largely associated with race; today, they have
increasingly also become a marker of class as poor and working-class white
families have adopted some of the same practices.106 A number of states,
such as California, override local zoning laws to ensure that all
communities include affordable housing, while other states have allowed
racial and economic segregation to become more entrenched.107
Today, as much as in 1979, there is no agreement about whether the
relationship between the constitution of family and the constitution of
community should involve a red embrace of established values in the public
square or a blue celebration of individual choice coupled with the
construction of communities designed to support all of our children.

102. This may be true for many reasons, including their association with poverty.
103. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
104. See Burt, supra note 15.
105. See Katia Brener, Note, Belle Terre and Single-Family Home Ordinances: Judicial
Perceptions of Local Government and the Presumption of Validity, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 447,
454 (1999).
106. See generally JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW
INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014); CHARLES MURRAY, COMING
APART (2012).
107. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 65580–65589.8 (West 2017) (requiring localities to meet
their “fair share” of the need for housing at all income levels, specifically including the need
for very low-, low-, and moderate-income housing); CHETTY & HENDREN, supra note 12
(ranking municipalities in terms of their opportunities for social mobility).

